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STRENGTHENING EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
IN MARYLAND: TERRITORIAL CLASSIFICATION AND IN RE TRADER1
Until recently 2 juveniles charged with the commission of delinquent
acts in the State of Maryland were subjected to different treatment.
Proceedings brought against juveniles for offenses allegedly committed in
Montgomery County were regulated by the public local law embodied in
§§ 4-501 to -530 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the
Maryland Annotated Code,4 while juveniles apprehended in connection with
offenses allegedly occurring in all other subdivisions of the state were
governed by the provisions set forth in §§ 3-801 to -842 of that article.5
Despite substantial uniformity of purpose, 6 and general similarity of substantive and procedural provisions, 7 significant variation in the treatment
of juveniles under those statutes was evident.
That disparity, not rectified until the Governor signed legislation
mandating the uniform treatment of juveniles in 1975,8 formed the basis
for the decision in In Re Trader.9 In that case, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland was confronted with challenges brought by four juveniles to the
statutory plan differentially treating youths charged with the commission
3

1. 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).
2. The inequalities in the treatment of juveniles discussed herein were ameliorated by the passage of ch. 554, [1975] Md. Laws 2670, which will be codified in §§
3-801 to -833 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Maryland Annotated Code. The special provisions relating to the handling of juveniles charged with
the commission of delinquent acts in Montgomery County were repealed and numerous
additions were made to the then existing statutes governing the disposition of cases
against such juveniles in other parts of the state. Unless otherwise indicated, all
reference to juvenile law code sections is to the statutes as they existed prior to the
1975 legislative actions (and at the time of the decision in In re Trader, 272 Md. 364,
325 A.2d 398 (1974)), which may be found at ch. 2, § 1, [19731 Md. Laws, Sp. Sess.
7, 134-68, 184-204.
3. A "delinquent act" was defined at the time of the decision in In re Trader,
supra note 1, as "an act which is in violation of the State Vehicle Law, any other
traffic violation, or an act which would be a crime if done by a person who is not
a child." Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 136 (§ 3-801(j) of the repealed
juvenile statutes). See also the definition of a delinquent child provided at Ch. 2, § 1,
[1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 184 (§ 4-501(e) of the repealed juvenile statutes).
4. Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 184-204.
5. Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 134-68.
6. Compare § 3-802 and § 4-502 of the repealed juvenile statutes. Ch. 2, § 1,
[1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 140-41, 185-86. Both sections emphasized the need to
strengthen familial ties. Each suggested separation from family for the juvenile only if
necessary to the child's welfare or if in the state's interest. Additionally, the creation of
rehabilitative and disciplinary programs consistent with such purposes was encouraged.
7. See discussion in In re Trader, 20 Md. App. 1, 6, 315 A.2d 528, 532 (1974).
8. See discussion at note 2 supra.
9. 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).
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of delinquent acts. Although each challenge was decided separately in the
lower courts, as discussed below, the Court of Appeals considered the issue
in each sufficiently similar to warrant a consolidated decision.
This note will examine the nature of equal protection analysis undertaken by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, especially in instances where
rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment were allegedly infringed
by the operation of state schemes using territory as a basis for classification.
It concludes that in future cases in which state statutes are challenged as
violative of the equal protection clause, the Maryland Court of Appeals
may strengthen the minimal scrutiny test which it has traditionally utilized
to evaluate such claims. This trend to invigorate equal protection analysis
in Maryland is foreshadowed in In Re Trader.
The Cases of the Juveniles
After petitions asserting that Richard Lee Trader was a delinquent
child were filed, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Division of Juvenile
Causes, granted the State's Attorney's request that jurisdiction over the
juvenile be waived. 10 Trader was later the subject of an indictment for
arson and related offenses. The Criminal Court of Baltimore City held
§ 3-817, by which orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction were deemed interlocutory (and consequently not immediately appealable) to be unconstitutional." Noting that such orders were immediately appealable in Montgomery County, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court, holding § 3-817 unconstitutional as a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution of the United States. The Court of
Special Appeals cited with approval the lower court opinion, which stated:
We think the denial of appeal everywhere in the State except Montgomery County to be . .. arbitrary, unreasonably discriminatory and
unrelated to any legitimate State objective .

. .

. The child waived

to criminal court in other than Montgomery County, even if ultimately
acquitted or even if afforded appellate review of the waiver after
conviction, has been compelled to stand trial on criminal charges as an
adult, unlike the child in Montgomery County, without the opportunity

of an appellate determination whether the waiver procedure met statutory and constitutional requirements.' 2
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari.
10. Such waiver was granted pursuant to § 3-817 of the repealed juvenile statutes,
which provided:
An order waiving jurisdiction is interlocutory. If, subsequently, any minor
with respect to whom the court has waived jurisdiction under this section is
alleged to be a delinquent child the court may waive jurisdiction after summary review.
Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 150. Note that with the enactment of
§ 3-817(f) of the new juvenile laws, "An order waiving jurisdiction is immediately
appealable" in all state subdivisions. Ch. 554, [1975] Md. Laws 2685.
11. 272 Md. 364, 371, 325 A.2d 398, 402 (1974).
12. 20 Md. App. at 9, 315 A.2d at 534.
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Emmit W. Stokes, a sixteen-year-old, was alleged to have committed
armed robbery and was charged in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City after
he was excluded from the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City,
Division of Juvenile Causes, by operation of § 3-808(4). 13 No comparable
provision existed in Montgomery County which authorized the exemption
of juveniles above the age of sixteen charged with armed robbery. The
Criminal Court of Baltimore City granted Stokes' motion to dismiss his
indictment, basing its decision upon the holding of the Court of Special
Appeals in In Re Trader, and held that § 3-808(4) denied Stokes the
equal protection of the laws.1 4 The Court of Appeals again granted
certiorari.
The State requested waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over Roger M.
Faulkner after alleging him to be a delinquent child. 15 Faulkner moved to
dismiss the State's request, contending that § 3-816(b) (1)16 contravened
13. Section 3-808 of the repealed juvenile statutes exempted from the jurisdiction
of juvenile courts in all Maryland subdivisions excepting Montgomery County:
(1) A child 14 years old or older alleged to have done an act which, if com-

mitted by an adult, would be a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment,
or an associated offense, unless an order removing the proceeding to the juvenile
court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27;
(2) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have done an act in violation of
any provision of the state Vehicle Law or any other traffic law or ordinance
except when a charge is manslaughter by automobile, possession of a stolen
motor vehicle, unauthorized use or occupancy of a motor vehicle, tampering with
a motor vehicle, or violation of § 11-902 of the state Vehicle Law;
(3) A child 16 years or older alleged to have done an act in violation of any
provision of law, rule, or regulation governing the use or operation of a boat
except when a charge of manslaughter by boat, possession of a stolen boat, tampering with a boat, or operating a boat while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or drugs.
(4) A child 16 years old or older alleged to have committed the crime of
robbery with a deadly weapon, unless an order removing the proceeding to the
juvenile court has been filed pursuant to § 594A of Article 27.
Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 144-45. Section 594A of Article 27 enables
non-juvenile courts to transfer jurisdiction over children between the ages of fourteen
and eighteen who have been otherwise excluded from juvenile jurisdiction in juvenile
courts if such transfers are deemed to be in the best interest of the child or society.
14. The opinion of the Criminal Court was quoted by the Court of Appeals:
"[w]henever any substantial right or privilege is granted to a juvenile in Montgomery
County, all other juveniles in the State are entitled to the same right or privilege." 272
Md. at 376, 325 A.2d at 405.
15. It was charged that Faulkner had committed assault with intent to murder,
had illegally used a handgun in a crime of violence, and had unlawfully broken and
entered a home with intent to commit a felony. Brief of Appellant (In re Trader,
272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974), at 6 n.3 [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellant].
16. Section 3-816 of the repealed juvenile statutes, entitled "Waiver of juvenile
jurisdiction," provided the following:
(a) In General. - After a petition alleging delinquency is filed and before the
adjudicatory hearing, but after the notice prescribed by the Maryland Rules,
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the equal protection clause because it was a segment of a statutory scheme
treating juveniles charged with similar offenses in different counties differently. Section 3-816 permitted waiver of juvenile jurisdiction of fourteen and fifteen-year-olds, whereas § 4-506(a), 17 applicable only to Montgomery County, established a minimum age of sixteen for waiver purposes.
At an evidentiary hearing, Faulkner presented numerous expert witnesses
whose testimony supported his contention that no rational basis existed
which would justify different treatment of fourteen and fifteen-year-old
juveniles in Montgomery County from that afforded those in the rest of
the state.' 8 The State presented no evidence to show that such a rational

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

Ch. 2, §

the court may hold a waiver hearing and waive the exclusive jurisdiction conferred by § 3-804.
Limitations of Waiver. - Anything to the contrary notwithstanding, jurisdiction may only be waived on:
(1) A child 14 years old or older; or
(2) A child who has not reached his 14th birthday, and who is charged
with committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would be
punishable by death or life imprisonment
Factors to be considered. - In making a determination as to waiver of
jurisdiction the court shall consider the following:
(1) Age of child;
(2) Mental and physical condition of child;
(3) The child's amenability to treatment in any institution, facility, or
program available to delinquents;
(4) The nature of the offense; and
(5) The public safety.
Court may request study. - For the purpose of making its determination,
the court may request that a study concerning the child, his family, his environment, and other matters relevant to the disposition of the case be made.
Procedure when jurisdiction waived. - If the jurisdiction is waived, the
court may order the child or minor held for trial under the regular procedures
of the court which would have jurisdiction over the offense if committed
by an adult.
1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 149-50.

17. Montgomery County juvenile courts were able to waive jurisdiction pursuant
to the provisions of § 4-506 of the repealed juvenile statutes:
(a) Conditions for waiver. - After a full investigation, the court may waive
jurisdiction if :
(1) A child 16 years old or older is charged with committing an act which
would amount to a misdemeanor or a felony if committed by -n
adult; or
(2) A child under the age of 14 is charged with committing an act which
would be punishable by death or life imprisonment if committed by
an adult
(b) Prosecution after waiver. If the court waives jurisdiction under this
section, he shall order the child proceeded against as an adult
Ch. 2, § 1, [1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 187-88.
18. Among the witnesses presented by Faulkner were the Director of the Department of Juvenile Services, the Director of Child Psychiatry at Sheppard and Enoch
Pratt Hospital, the Superintendent of Spring Grove Hospital; the Clinical Psychologist
and Chief of the Department of Child Psychology at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt
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basis in fact existed. 19 The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Division of
Juvenile Causes dismissed the State's request for waiver, adjudging § 3-816
(b) (1) to be unconstitutional. The State subsequently appealed to the
Court of Special Appeals. The matter was transferred to the Court of
Appeals when it granted certiorari before a decision by the Court of Special
20
Appeals.
The Kent County Circuit Court approved the State's motion for
waiver of juvenile jurisdiction over Calvin Thomas pursuant to § 3-816
(b) (1) after it was charged that Thomas was a delinquent. Citing the
unconstitutionality of § 3-816(b) (1) for the reasons argued by Faulkner,
Thomas appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The State there urged
dismissal of that appeal on the basis that such waiver orders were not
reviewable prior to final judgment under § 3-817. The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari before a decision of the Court of Special Appeals was
2
rendered. '
Decision by the Court of Appeals
All four of the cases above were consolidated upon appeal after
certiorari had been granted by the Court of Appeals.
Reversing the decisions of the Court of Special Appeals and the
Baltimore City Criminal Court in the case of Richard Lee Trader, the
Court of Appeals held that Trader had failed to show that § 3-817 was
violative of his right to the equal protection of the laws. Judge Murphy,
writing for the court, observed that the Maryland judiciary had traditionally
Hospital, a clinical psychiatrist with much experience with juveniles, a law enforcement officer from Montgomery County experienced in juvenile matters there as well
as in other jurisdictions, a statistician who detailed crime and demographic studies,
and the Warden of the Baltimore City Jail.
Witnesses were in general agreement that: (1) Fourteen and fifteen-year-olds
in Montgomery County were no "more amenable to treatment," that is, no more
responsive to rehabilitative programs, than their counterparts in the rest of the state;
(2) such juveniles in Montgomery County would not be "less likely to commit serious
offenses" than fourteen and fifteen-year-olds in other jurisdictions; (3) youngsters
of fourteen and fifteen years in Montgomery County were no "less of a danger to the
public safety" than were their counterparts in other Maryland jurisdictions; (4) such
a class of juveniles in Montgomery County were no "less of a danger to themselves"
than were fourteen and fifteen-year-olds elsewhere in the state; and (5) Montgomery
County fourteen and fifteen-year-olds were not farther removed from adulthood as a
result of emotional or physical immaturity than were equally young juveniles in other
Maryland jurisdictions. See relevant portions of the summary of evidence made by
Judge Hammerman in the lower court opinion. Brief of Appellant at 7-10.
19. 272 Md. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418.
20. Faulkner moved to dismiss the State's appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Criminal Court's order was interlocutory and that the decision not to
waive juvenile jurisdiction was therefore not immediately appealable. See discussion
Brief of Appellees (In re Trader, 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974)) at I-IV [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellees], and 272 Md. at 377, 325 A.2d at 405.
21. 272 Md. at 377, 325 A.2d at 405.
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applied the rational basis test to evaluate the validity of claimed violations
of equal protection rights arising from statutory schemes drawing territorial
distinctions.2 2 While expressing doubt as to the wisdom of the legislative
classification in question, Judge Murphy acknowledged the presumption
of constitutionality which attaches to such a determination by the legislature.2 3 Such a presumption stands in the absence of a presentation of
evidence by the party attacking the validity of the classification in question
which would clearly and convincingly show that the classification was
arbitrary and did not in fact rest upon any reasonable ground.2 4 The court
held that Trader had failed to meet that burden since no evidence was
presented on his behalf which would have demonstrated a lack of such
reasonable basis.2 5 Since the classification was not otherwise "so irrational
as to be invidiously discriminatory on its face," 2 6 Trader's mere allegation
of its unconstitutionality was held by the court not to be a basis upon which
a finding of a denial of equal protection guarantees could be predicated.
The court reached a conclusion in the case of Stokes similar to that
in the case of Trader, since Stokes likewise failed to make the requisite
showing that § 3-808 did not rest upon any reasonable basis. 2 7 As to
Thomas, the Court of Appeals noted that no evidence had been introduced
by the juvenile proving the unconstitutionality of § 3-817. Consequently,
the State's motion to dismiss the juvenile's appeal was granted, since
§ 3-817 rendered orders waiving juvenile court jurisdiction interlocutory.28
As to Faulkner, the only case in which a result favorable to the
defendant was reached by the court, the State had appealed from a juvenile
court decision refusing to waive jurisdiction over Faulkner. The Court of
Appeals dismissed the appeal of the State, holding the decision of the
juvenile court to be interlocutory. 29 The court cautioned, however, that
in future cases in which evidence "tending to demonstrate that the Legislature had no rational basis" for a prescribed difference is adduced by the
22. Id. at 389, 325 A.2d at 411. The traditional rational basis test was set
forth in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). See text accompanying notes 55-56 infra; Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt, 267
Md. 660, 671, 299 A.2d 1, 7 (1973); Mount Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v.
Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 111 Md. 561, 75 A. 105 (1909); and
State v. Broadbelt, 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771 (1899).
23. 272 Md. at 400, 325 A.2d at 417.
24. See Prince George's County v. McBride, 268 Md. 522, 532, 302 A.2d 620, 625
(1973), where the court noted: "A cardinal rule to be observed where a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause is claimed is that one who assails a legislative classification must sustain the burden of proving that it does not rest on any reasonable
basis ....
" See relevant discussion in State v. Shapiro, 131 Md. 168, 172, 101 A. 703,
705 (1917).
25. 272 Md. at 400, 325 A.2d at 417.
26. Id. at 401, 325 A.2d at 417. A similar standard was applied in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961).
27. 272 Md. at 401-02, 325 A.2d at 418.
28. Id. at 402-03, 325 A.2d at 418.
29. Id. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418. See note 20 supra.
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defendant without contradiction by the State, "[T] he juvenile courts might
well conclude that no rational basis exists for the different treatment."8 0
TerritorialClassificationand the Equal Protection Clause
Implicit in the court's adoption of the rational basis test to evaluate
the constitutional validity of the statutory scheme challenged by the
juveniles was a rejection of the State's contention that territory as a
classificatory basis was not violative of the equal protection clause even in
the absence of any reasonable basis. 31 An adoption of such contention by
the State would have permitted disparate legal standards in intrastate
jurisdictions not premised upon justifiable bases.
In several instances the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality2
of state statutes involving territorial classifications. In Missouri v. Lewisa
the Court was faced with a Missouri statute granting exclusive jurisdiction
over appeals for St. Louis and four adjacent counties in a district appellate
court. The statute at the same time placed jurisdiction over identical
appeals from all other subdivisions in the state's highest court. Justice
Bradley there stated:
We might go still further, and say, with undoubted truth, that
there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent any State from adopting any system of laws or judicature it sees fit for all or any part of
its territory. If the State of New York, for example, should see fit
to adopt the civil law and its method of procedure for New York City
and the surrounding counties, and the common law and its method
of procedure for the rest of the State, there is nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent its doing so. This would not,
of itself, within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, be a denial
to any person of the equal protection of the laws. If every person
residing or being in either portion of the State should be accorded the
equal protection of the laws prevailing there, he could not justly
complain of a violation of the clause referred to. For as before said, it
has respect to persons and classes of persons. It means that no person
or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and under like circumstances. 83
An analogous situation confronted the Court in the decision of
Salsburg v. Maryland.3 4 A Maryland statute allowed the State to admit
into evidence, in the course of prosecution for some gambling offenses in
the courts of Anne Arundel, Prince George's and Wicomico Counties,
items obtained through illegal search and seizure. The introduction of
such evidence was impermissible in all other counties within the state and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

272 Md. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418.
Brief of Appellant at 13.
101 U.S. 22 (1880).
Id. at 31.
346 U.S. 545 (1954).
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in Baltimore City. The Court, while placing great reliance upon its earlier
decision in Missouri v. Lewis,35 stated that "The Equal Protection Clause
6
relates to equality between persons as such rather than between areas."
37
It affirmed the holding of the Maryland Court of Appeals, and adjudged
the state statute to be constitutional.
In McGowan v. Maryland,35 the Supreme Co urt was again faced with
a Maryland statute allegedly in violation of the equal protection clause.
The state provisions allowed retail merchants in one county (Anne
Arundel) to sell certain items on Sundays whereas similar merchants in
other subdivisions were not permitted to make the same sales on that day.
The Court upheld the validity of the statute in question, noting that:
[W]e have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality
between persons as such, rather than between areas and that territorial
uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite. With particular reference to the State of Maryland, we have noted that the prescription of
different substantive offenses in different counties is generally a matter
for legislative discretion. We find no invidious discrimination here.3 9
Other courts confronted with variances in territorial uniformity of statutes
40
have reached similar conclusions.
The State would have had the Court of Appeals apply a broad reading
of Lewis and Salsburg in In Re Trader in order that it might have found
territorial classification to be constitutional even in the absence of any
reasonable basis. Such a holding would seem to have exempted territorial
classifications from constitutional limitations.. Nevertheless, Lewis, Salsburg, and McGowan have been given such a broad interpretation in at
least two instances. In Mathis v. North Carolina,41 the constitutionality of
a state scheme which varied punishment for the issuance of valueless checks
as between different groups of counties in the state was brought into question.
After noting Salsburg, the federal district court upheld the validity of the
statute despite a lack of an apparent or conjectural rational basis. In
Hogan v. Rosenberg,42 a state statute granted all state residents except
those living in the City of New York the right to trial by jury when
charged with the commission of a misdemeanor. The New York court
35. 101 U.S. 22 (1880).
36. 346 U.S. at 551. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Ocampo
v. United States, 234 U.S. 91 (1914); Hayes v. Missouri. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
37. 201 Md. 212, 94 A.2d 280 (1953).
38. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
39. Id. at 427. See discussion in 272 Md. at 388, 325 A.2d at 411.
40. Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U.S. 184 (1912) ; Mallet v. North Carolina, 181 U.S.
589 (1901); Kail v. Rockefeller, 275 F. Supp. 937 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); New York
State Ass'n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1967);
State ex rel. Todd v. Hatcher, 301 N.E.2d 766 (Ind. 1973) ; and Louisiana v. Johnson,
249 La. 950, 192 So. 2d 135 (1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 923 (1967).
41. 266 F. Supp. 841 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
42. 24 N.Y.2d 207, 247 N.E.2d 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1969), rev'd sub nor.
on other grounds, Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
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found the statute to be constitutional, stating: "The Supreme Court has
recognized that territorial discrimination as between different States and
even as between different parts of the same State is not of itself violative of
the equal protection clause, even if the State has no reasonable basis for
43
making such a distinction."
It is clear, however, as Harold W. Horowitz and Diana L. Neitring
pointed out several years ago,4 4 that the Lewis and Salsburg cases must
be given a more limited interpretation. 45 In both cases, the Supreme Court
found the established territorial classifications to be a response to a recognized public concern. In Lewis, the establishment of a separate appellate
system for the more densely populated portions of Missouri surrounding
St. Louis was justifiable in view of the benefits received from "convenience
and economy in judicial administration." 46 Furthermore, the Court observed that the detrimental effect of the scheme upon the individual, in
that one might be subject to different, but not unequal treatment, was not
sufficiently significant as to warrant a finding of a violation of the equal
protection clause. 47 In Salsburg, the Court recognized that the Maryland
statute was a legislative response to the especially high level of gambling
taking place in Anne Arundel, Prince George's and Wicomico Counties.
The Court therefore stated that there was a reasonable ground in light
of which the experimental measure in question might be enacted. 48 The
Court additionally noted that the exclusionary rule was then "peculiarly
43. 24 N.Y.2d at 216,. 247 N.E.2d at 265, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 430. The Court of
Appeals noted its awareness of the language in Hogan, 272 Md. at 389, 325 A.2d at
411. The Hogan court found- a rational basis for the classificatory framework adopted
by the State. The differences were considered necessary in view of the immense and
burdensome caseload extant in the highly populated city of New York. 24 N.Y.2d at
217-18, 247 N.E.2d at 265, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 431. Potential flaws in the court's reasoning were set forth by dissenting Judges Burke and Keating. Id. at 230-32, 247 N.E.2d
at 273-75, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 441-44.
44. Horowitz and Neitring, Equal Protection Aspects of Inequalities in Public

Education and Public Assistance Programs From Place to Place Within a State, 15

U.C.L.A. L. REv. 787 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Horowitz and Neitring]. The
authors comprehensively review and analyze many cases involving territorially classificatory schemes established by states, concluding that such cases:
[A]II make clear that territorial differences in the treatment of individuals under
the law within a state are subject to equal protection limitations. It is no longer
a sound generalization that equal protection requirements are satisfied if there
is a rational basis for the territorial difference.
Id. at 803-04.
45. Id. at 790.
46. Id. at 791. Relevant discussion may also be found in the Brief of Appellees
at 18-19.
47. 101 U.S. at 33. See discussion in Horowitz and Neitring, supra note 44, at
790-91 and in Brief of Appellees at 18.
48. 346 U.S. at 550-53. See discussion in Horowitz and Neitring, supra note 44,
at 791.
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discretionary with the law-making authority." 49 Finally, any attempt to
interpret McGowan5" broadly must be viewed together with the Supreme
Court's observation:
The record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable
basis does not exist, that the statutory distinctions are invidious, that
local tradition and custom might not rationally call for this legislative
treatment .

. .

. [T]here would appear to be many valid reasons for

these exceptions, as is stated above, and no evidence to dispel them.51
Any argument suggesting territorial classifications to be constitutionally
valid even in the absence of a rational basis, and relying on McGowan, is
weak in light of the Court's reference to and consideration of potential
rational bases.
The Development of Equal Protection Analysis
When seen from this more restricted perspective, such classifications
become subject to at least some degree of constitutional limitation. Although that degree of limitation has in some cases resulted in a stringent
review of the classifications in question,52 courts have been more likely to
53
evaluate the statutory plan utilizing a lenient standard.
Courts have regularly employed only the most minimal scrutiny in
cases involving legislatively drawn classificatory schemes resulting in
different treatment in several territorial subdivisions. Under such minimal
49.
50.
51.
52.

346 U.S. at 550.
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Id. Cited in 272 Md. at 387, 325 A.2d at 410-11.
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

The strict scrutiny test

is explained in greater detail at notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
53. Courts have not hesitated, however, even under minimal scrutiny, to invalidate statutes when territorial classifications resulted in discrimination violative of
the equal protection clause. In Long v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970),
aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971), the federal district court was faced with a statute
which exempted sixteen and seventeen-year-olds arrested in Baltimore City from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. No such exclusion was mandated in the case of
sixteen and seventeen-year-olds charged with offenses in the other state subdivisions.
Evidence was presented showing a lack of any rational basis for the classification and
the statute was declared unconstitutional. 316 F. Supp. at 30. In Commissioner of
Public Welfare ex rel. Martinez v. Torres, 263 App. Div. 19, 22-23, 31 N.Y.S.2d 101,
105 (1941), the court was unable to discover a rational basis behind a statute which
burdened defendants with the production of certain evidence supporting their claims
in paternity suits in New York City, while not mandating such testimony in other
intrastate jurisdictions. In Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193
Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949), the Court of Appeals refused to uphold a statute regulating strip mining operations. The Maryland statute exempted Garrett County from its
regulations. Although it was applicable to all other parts of the state, strip mining
was conducted only in Garrett and Allegany Counties. The court could find no basis
for a classification which would have regulated operations in Allegany County but
exempted operations in Garrett County.
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scrutiny, such schemes were subject to invalidation -only in the event that
54
no conceivable rational basis for the difference in treatment could be found.
55
The test was early stated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
where the Supreme Court stated:
1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does
not take from the State the power to classify in the adoption of police
laws, but admits of the exercise of a wide scope of direction in that
regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary.
2. A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend
against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.
3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be
assumed.
4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the
burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but
is essentially arbitrary.5"
Thus, when the traditional rational basis test was employed by the
courts, state legislative bodies were accorded "a wide scope of discretion
in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than
others," the exercise of which would be considered unconstitutionally discriminatory only if based "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
'57
of the State's objective.
Some cases have provided the courts opportunity to exercise more
rigorous scrutiny of legislatively drawn classificatory schemes. Such greater
intensity of review has been evidenced in cases in which state schemes have
been based upon inherently "suspect" differences among persons subjected
to disparate legislative treatment, 58 or in cases in which the "fundamental"
54. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457 (1957) ; Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949);
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
55. 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In Lindsley, the Court held a state statute regulating
underground reservoirs to be valid. The classificatory plan prohibited certain landowners from the removal, by pumping or other means, of excessive quantities of gas

contained in underground reservoirs.
56. 220 U.S. at 78 (emphasis supplied).
57. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425.

Similarly, the Court stated in

Salsburg v. Maryland:
The cumbersomeness of such centrally enacted legislation as compared with the
variations which may result from home rule is a matter for legislative discretion,
not judicial supervision, except where there is a clear conflict with constitutional
limitations. We find no such conflict here.
346 U.S. at 552-53 (emphasis supplied).
58. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving

v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(indigency) ; and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage).
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rights or interests of such persons have been adversely affected by the
questioned classifications.59 "Unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling state interest," 60 such state schemes have uniformly been struck
down.
An Alabama legislative reapportionment statute was alleged to infringe
upon rights guaranteed under the equal protection clause in Reynolds v.
Sims.61 The Supreme Court determined that the fundamental interest of
certain Alabama residents in a right to vote was "unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when compared
with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State."16 2 The Court felt
that a more stringent standard of review than that afforded by the traditional rational-basis test was appropriate in view of the adverse impact of
the reapportionment scheme upon the fundamental interest in the right to
vote. "Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
6 3
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,"
the Court stated, "any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote
must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."64 As a result, the Court
held that Alabama should be required to show that the classificatory
scheme drawn into question was established pursuant to clearly rational
legislative objectives, and stated that "unless relevant to the permissible
59. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)

Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)

(right to travel);
(voting) ; Griffin v.

(right to equal treatment on appeal of a criminal con-

viction) ; and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)

(right to procreation).

60. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). It is interesting to note,
therefore, that in these cases, the burden of proof required to sustain the classification
is shifted to the party seeking to uphold it. Compare Shapiro with Lindsley, notes 55-56
and accompanying text supra. It may also be asserted that in addition to shifting the
burden of proof, courts in such cases have also increased the quantum of proof required.
61. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
62. Id. at 568.
63. Id. at 562. The Supreme Court has found the protection of the right to vote
in such an "unimpaired manner" as particularly important in other circumstances.
See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where the Court
suggested, in applying the more traditional rationality test:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. (citations omitted)
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under

the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.
304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Accord, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973), suggesting that remedies for per-pupil educational expenditure
differentials between state established territorial subdivisions are "matters reserved
for the legislative processes . .. ."

64. 377 U.S. at 562 (emphasis supplied).
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purposes of legislative reapportionment" 65 the plan would be considered
invalid under the fourteenth amendment. Discerning no such relevance,
the Alabama plan was deemed unconstitutional. Consequently, it may be
asserted that Reynolds v. Sims held that a stringent standard of review
will be used by the Court to evaluate state schemes infringing upon constitutionally protected fundamental interests.
Courts employing the "two-tiered"0 6 formula of the "rational basis"
and "strict scrutiny" tests have encountered considerable difficulty in
recent years. Professor Gunther has observed:
Some situations evoked the aggressive "new" equal protection, with
scrutiny that was "strict" in theory and fatal in fact; in other conreigned, with minimal
texts, the deferential "old" equal protection
67
scrutiny in theory and virtually none in fact.
In an attempt to alleviate the growing dissatisfaction with the existing
equal protection standards, which have been considered too inflexible in
their use, the Supreme Court, beginning with the dissent of Justice Marshall
in Dandridge v. Williams,6 5 has tried to develop a new test of legislative
rationality capable of utilization in all equal protection cases. While not
embracing the "sliding scale test" enunciated by Justice Marshall, the
Court has nevertheless intensively examined the means by which legislative
objectives have been achieved in classificatory schemes. 69 This intense
examination has occurred in recent cases despite the fact that the Court
65. Id. at 565.
66. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gunther]. Professor Gunther
examined the "two-tiered" equal protection analysis utilized by the Burger Court.
Id. at 12. He observed that the Burger Court was hesitant to further enlarge the
number of "suspect" criteria or "fundamental" interests triggering the use of "strict
scrutiny," and yet felt uneasy with the inflexibility of the "two-tiered" framework.
The result, Gunther determined, was a decision by the Burger Court to employ the
equal protection clause "as an interventionist tool" in a manner not utilizing the
"strict scrutiny" format, thus putting "new bite" in the "old" equal protection. Id. A
discussion of the equal protection tests may also be found in Developments in the
Law - Equal Protection,82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
67. Gunther, supra note 66, at 8.
68. 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In Dandridge, Justice Marshall noted that under the
facts of the case:
[E]qual protection analysis . . [was] not appreciably advanced by the a priori
definition of a "right," fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be
placed upon the character of the classification in question, the relative importance
to individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that
they do not receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.
Id. at 520. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (White, J.,
concurring) ; and Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972), where Justice
Marshall described the test to be utilized as one of whether "an appropriate governmental interest [is] suitably furthered by the differential treatment."
69. Gunther, supra note 66, at 20-21.
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has ostensibly employed the traditional rational basis test. 70 Professor
Gunther has described the new test of rationality of such legislative classifications as "[p]utting consistent new bite into the old equal protection."'
Continued utilization of such a new test, he continues:
[w]ould mean that the Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would have the Court
assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial
basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have
the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the
basis of materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting
to rationalizations created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
But it would be considerably less strict than the new equal protection. First, it would concern itself solely with means, not with
ends .... The yardstick for the acceptability of the means would be

the purposes chosen by the legislatures, not "constitutional" interests
drawn from the value perceptions of the Justices.
Moreover, the strengthened "rationality" scrutiny would curtail
the state's choice72of means far less severely than the new equal protection approach.
The model requires that there be an affirmative relation between means
and ends - or, in more traditional equal protection terms, that there
be a genuine difference in terms of the state's objective between the
group within the classification,
and those without. To a large extent,
73
that is an empirical inquiry.
Equal Protection Analysis in Maryland
In In Re Trader,74 the Maryland Court of Appeals manifested its
discomfort with the application of its own traditional test of legislative
rationality, when faced with strenuously asserted claims of infringement
upon constitutionally protected personal rights. 75 The court in In Re Trader
relied heavily upon the recent Supreme Court decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 76 a case in which the Court
continued to strengthen the minimal rationality standard by applying its
77
new invigorated test.
70. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). See discussion in Gunther,
supra note 66, at 18-19.
71. Gunther, supranote 66, at 21.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 47 (emphasis supplied).
74. 272 Md. 364, 325 A.2d 398 (1974).
75. See discussion in text accompanying notes 10-21 supra.
76. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
77. The decision inRodriguez was significantly based upon an empirical examination, the Court having studied a great deal of evidence concerning the nature of the
financing of the Texas school system presented by the State. 411 U.S. at 6-17, 44-55.
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In a series of cases, decided prior to the Supreme Court decision in
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 7s in which violation of equal protection guarantees were asserted, the Maryland Court of Appeals applied a
test 'of rationality of legislative enactments similar to that which had been
utilized to evaluate other constitutional challenges.7 9 In State v. Broadbelt,sO
the court stated that a classification must "be based upon reasonable
grounds. It must not depend on distinctions which do not furnish any
proper basis for the attempted classification."'
Similarly, in Watson v.
State,s 2 the court observed:
[T] hat if the classification is reasonable and bears any proper relation
to the object sought to be accomplished, that object being in itself a
lawful and proper purpose, it is not forbidden by the Fourteenth
Amendment.8"
Since shortly after the decision of the Supreme Court in Lindsley the
Maryland courts have consistently employed the criteria enunciated therein
to evaluate equal protection challenges to legislative enactments.8 4 In
Furthermore, rather than concern itself largely with a study of the ends of the system
(the provision of education for Texas school children) or with the establishment of a
new fundamental interest (the right to education), the Court scrutinized carefully
the means chosen by the state to finance that school system (the established property
tax scheme and additional revenues). A positive relation between the means and the
ends was found by the Court, in that such a relationship existed between the financing
system existing in Texas and the goal of the provision of education for Texas public
school children. See the criteria for the strengthened rational basis test given by
Professor Gunther at notes 71-73 supra and accompanying text.
78. 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
79. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819), a case testing the
validity of a Congressional action under the Commerce Clause, where the Supreme
Court stated:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adopted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.
Note the similarity to the description of the Supreme Court's new equal protection
test given by Professor Gunther. "Stated most simply," he observed:
[I]t would have the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has
never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further
legislative ends. The equal protection requirement that legislative classifications
must have a substantial relationship to legislative purposes is, after all, essentially
a more specific formulation of that general principle.
Gunther, supranote 66, at 20.
80. 89 Md. 565, 43 A. 771 (1899).
81. Id. at 581, 43 A. at 773, where the court cites with approval Gulf, Colorado
and Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
82. 105 Md. 650, 66 A. 635 (1907).
83. Id. at 655, 66 A. at 637 (emphasis supplied). See Clark v. Harford Agricultural & Breeders' Ass'n, 118 Md. 608, 85 A. 503 (1912) ; Mount Vernon-Woodberry
Cotton Duck Co. v. Frankfort Marine Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 111 Md. 561, 75
A. 105 (1909) ; Storck v. Mayor & City Council, 101 Md. 476, 61 A. 330 (1905)
Herbert v. County Comm'rs, 97 Md. 639, 55 A. 376 (1903).
84. Cf. Criswell v. State, 126 Md. 103, 110, 94 A. 549, 551 (1915).
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Wampler v. LeCompte, s5 the court directly quoted with approval the fourfold test set forth in Lindsley,s6 and applied it to a case in which a statutory
discrimination against certain riparian landowners was alleged. The court
held that even though the State had not advanced actual reasons for the
statutory distinction, it could assume "until the contrary [was] shown, that
a state of facts in respect thereto existed, which warranted the Legislature
in so legislating,"87 and held the statute to be constitutional. In Tatlebaum
v. Pantex Manufacturing Corp.,8 a provision of the Conditional Sales Act
was claimed to infringe upon the equal protection clause. The appellants in
Tatlebaum alleged "that the Act, by declaring unrecorded conditional contracts void as to receivers, without making them void as to trustees,
create[d] an arbitrary classification" 8 9 violative of the fourteenth amendment. In deciding that question, the court held:
[T]he classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.90
Finding that the reasons for the distinction drawn in the statute were
imaginable, the court sustained the Act's validity. 91 And in Potomac Sand
& Gravel Co. v. Governdr,92 the court considered an equal protection attack
upon a portion of a public local law which prohibited anyone from dredging
for and removing sand and gravel from the marshlands of Charles County.
In upholding the territorial distinctions between Charles County and the
rest of the state provided by the statute, the court adopted the reasoning
provided in Allied American Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of
Motor Vehicles :9
The constitutional need for equal protection does not shackle the
legislature. It has the widest discretion in classifying those who are
85. 159 Md. 222, 150 A. 455 (1930).
86.
panying
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 225, 150 A. at 457. The Lindsley test is set forth in the text accomnotes 55-56 supra.
159 Md. at 228, 150 A. at 458.
204 Md. 360, 104 A.2d 813 (1954).
Id. at 369, 104 A.2d at 819.

90. Id. at 370, 104 A.2d at 819.
91. Id. at 373, 104 A.2d at 821. The court there stated:
We may presume that the reason why the Legislature did not give the same protection to creditors in a trusteeship as it did to creditors in a receivership is that
it considered the fact that an assignor for the benefit of creditors acts voluntarily, chooses his trustees, assigns his entire estate to them, defines their powers

and duties, and possibly even determines their compensation, and thus he might
have it within his power to make an assignment immediately after he purchases
property on conditional contracts, and thereby cause loss to unwary vendors.
For the reasons we have given we hold that the Act does not infringe the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. (emphasis supplied).
92. 266 Md. 358, 293 A.2d 241, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972).

93. 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).

328

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 35

to be regulated and taxed. Only if the grouping is without any reasonable basis, and so entirely arbitrary, is it forbidden. Abstract symmetry or mathematical nicety are not requisites. The selection need
not depend on scientific or marked differences in things or persons or
their relations. If any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain a classification, the existence of that state vof facts as a
basis for the passage of the law must be assumed. The burden is on
him who assails 94a classification to show that it does not rest on any
reasonable basis.
The minimal scrutiny of the means employed by the legislature in enacting classificatory schemes that was characteristic of Wampler, Tatlebaum and
Potomac Sand & Gravel is uniformly found in other cases in which the
court has sustained the validity of such plans against equal protection
attacks. 95 Under the Lindsley test, absent a showing by the party assailing
the validity of a legislative classificatory enactment that no rational basis
could be found for the distinctions thus drawn, the court has found itself
able to dismiss the challenge perfunctorily. But even if that burden of
proof has been met by the challenger, the requirements of the minimal
scrutiny test have not precluded the court from finding a reason sufficient
to sustain the validity of the statute questioned whether articulated or
conjectural. 96
This is not to say that Maryland courts have never struck down a
statute attacked on equal protection grounds under the minimal scrutiny
test. In Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines,97 for example,
the court found a statute differentially regulating identical strip-mining
operations in Garrett County and the rest of the state to be without any
rational basis, either articulated or conjectural, since there was no "difference between the conditions in the territory selected and the conditions
in the territory not affected by the statute sufficient to afford some basis,
however slight, for classification."98
94. Id. at 623, 150 A.2d at 431. The language from Allied American Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. is quoted by the court in Potomac Sand & Gravel, and is there recognized
to be a rephrasing of the Lindsley test. 266 Md. at 376, 293 A.2d at 250-51.
95. See, e.g., Prince George's County v. McBride, 268 Md. 522, 531, 302 A.2d 620,
624 (1973); Administrator, Motor Vehicle Administration v. Vogt, 267 Md. 660, 671,
299 A.2d 1, 7 (1973) ; Director v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 49-50, 221 A.2d 397, 417, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 940 (1966); Allied American Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 219
Md. 607, 623, 150 A.2d 421, 431 (1959); American Coal Co. v. County Comm'rs,
128 Md. 564, 577, 98 A. 143, 147 (1916).
96. Note that the requirements of the minimal scrutiny test are satisfied when
the court is able to conceive of a reason for the classification which has been brought
into question. In this manner, the validity of the classification may be upheld despite
the fact that the court may not have been presented with or may not find persuasive
reasons advanced by the state in support of the classification. See discussion of
Lindsley in text accompanying notes 55-56 supra.
97. 193 Md. 627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949). The facts of Maryland Coal & Realty Co.
may be found at note 53 supra.
98. Id. at 642, 69 A.2d at 477.
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The Court of Appeals declared the statute violative of the equal protection clause. Likewise, in Dasch v. Jackson,99 the court invalidated, as
being in contravention of fourteenth amendment guarantees, a statute regulating only those persons who were engaged as paperhangers in Baltimore
City, while not imposing similar regulations upon paperhangers in other
jurisdictions. The court held classificatory schemes:
[A] dopted for the purposes of the regulatory measure, must be reasonable, uniform in .

.

. operation within the class, and based upon some

legitimate principle of public policy.
Measured by that standard, the act under consideration [in the
case could not] be sustained as a valid exercise of legislative authority. 100
In both Maryland Coal & Realty Co. and Dasch, therefore, the court
struck down legislative classificatory schemes which had no rational basis,
either articulated or conjectural. In Mayor & City Council of Havre de
Grace v. Johnson,10 1 the court considered an equal protection attack upon a
local ordinance which forbade non-residents of Havre de Grace from operating taxicabs in the town, while permitting residents to do so. The court
stated:
[W]e

. . .

cannot assume as a matter of law that the operation of

an automobile hiring business by a non-resident of Havre de Grace
would, because of his non-residence, constitute a greater peril to the
health or welfare of that town than it would if operated by a resident.
A more reasonable and probable view would be that it was intended
to confer the monopoly of a profitable business upon residents of the
town. But whatever its purpo'se may have been, there can be no doubt
but that the ordinance is discriminatory
and unreasonable, and that
10
the municipality had no power to adopt it. 2
A similar result was reached in Jewel Tea Co. v. Town of Bel Air'03 and
in Blaustein v. State Tax Commission,'10 4 where the court rejected reasons

advanced to sustain legislative enactments faced with equal protection challenges as themselves being improper or unlawful efforts at discrimination
between members of the same general class. In each of these cases, a state
of facts reasonably could have been conceived that could have sustained
the challenged legislative enactment if the Lindsley test were literally applied. Nonetheless, in each of the cases the court found the classifications
to be arbitrary and therefore invalid.
In the 1971 decision in Bruce v. Director, Department of Chesapeake
Bay Affairs,10 5 the court seemed to apply a more exacting standard of
99. 170 Md. 251, 183 A. 534 (1936).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 268, 183 A. at 541.
143 Md. 601, 123 A. 65 (1923).
Id. at 608-09, 123 A. at 67 (emphasis supplied).
172 Md. 536, 192 A. 417 (1937).
176 Md. 423, 4 A.2d 861 (1939).
261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971).
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scrutiny to a legislative classificatory plan which adversely affected the
"fundamental rights or interests" of a prescribed class of individuals. In
doing so, the court came closest to adopting the strict scrutiny of the
"new" equal protection. Challenged in Bruce was a statute which placed
differing restrictions on the removal of crabs and oysters from tidal waters
by residents of various counties. The court found that a rational basis
existed for these differences in the direct effect of such regulations upon
the livelihood of several thousand watermen. Nonetheless, the court declared the statute to be violative of the equal protection clause, holding:
While it is true in the case at bar that a rational basis exists for
distinguishing between tidewater and non-tidewater counties, yet the
crab and oyster resources found in the tidal waters are common property held in trust by the State for all of its citizens, no matter in which
part of the state they may live. To that extent an otherwise legitimate
classification of residents which may be made for many purp-dses, cannot be made if it affects a right (in this case to the enjoyment and use
of natural6 resources) which, as citizens of this State, they enjoy
10
equally.
In Bruce, therefore, even though the court was presented with an otherwise valid rational basis which could, under the Lindsley test, sustain the
legislative classification, it rejected the scheme as violative of the equal
protection clause, the court invoking for that purpose the right of all
citizens of Maryland to equally enjoy the use of natural resources.
In each of the cases in which the court rejected a statutory plan it
evidenced a certain amount of discomfort with the test by which it invalidated the statute. The court often desired to sustain a valid claim of
personal and perhaps constitutionally protected rights, but in some cases,"0 7
was able to do so only by verging upon an expansion of the traditional
scope of the Lindsley test. Such expansions were only infrequently and
cautiously made because of the court's concern with its interplay with the
Legislature. In no case did the court desire to appear to be a "Superlegislature,"' 08 evaluating both the purpose of a legislative enactment and
the means by which it is achieved.
The Effect of In Re Trader
In In Re Trader, the court was presented with an opportunity to
adopt the more exacting scrutiny of the "new" equal protection, having been
presented with several claimed violations of allegedly fundamental rights. 0 9
106. Id. at 606, 276 A.2d at 211 (emphasis supplied). See discussion of Bruce in
Brief of Appellees at 78-79.
107. See discussion at notes 101-06 and accompanying text infra.
108. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969). The court in In re Trader
was aware of the Supreme Court's fear of assuming such a role. 272 Md. at 393-94,
325 A.2d at 413-14.
109. The juveniles asserted that the statute in question infringed upon several of
their fundamental rights. They first argued that their right to receive equal treatment
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The leap from the traditional rational basis test to that level of more
exacting scrutiny would not have been drastic in view of the recent holding
in Bruce. Nonetheless, the court rejected the contentions of the appellees
that certain of their fundamental rights have been infringed, relying heavily
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez that whether an interest
is fundamental or not lies in "[A]ssessing whether [it] is a right
u 0
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
In adopting that language, the Maryland Court of Appeals appeared
to be in agreement with the opinion of Justice Powell in Rodriguez, which
adopted Justice Harlan's dissenting view in Shapiro v. Thompson."' In
Rodriguez, Justice Powell stated:
[I]f the degree of judicial scrutiny of state legislation fluctuated depending on a majority's view of the importance of the interest affected,
[the Court] would have gone "far toward making [itself] a 'superlegislature'" . . . [Such a role would
be] one for which the Court
2

lacks both authority and competence."

Concern that the Court's decisional role would be viewed as that of a
"superlegislature" is evidenced in Rodriguez, Bruce and In Re Trader.113
In In Re Trader, the court therefore avowedly applied the traditional
rational basis test, concerned as it was with the means employed by the
legislature in enacting a classificatory plan, rather than its purpose. As a
result of that application, the results reached by the Court of Appeals as to
at trial and in the appellate process had been affected by the operation of the statute.
Citing, among others, the decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the appellees argued that the Supreme
Court had mandated that all persons charged with the commission of crimes must be
equally treated. Brief of Appellees at 72-75. Consequently, the "right of children
everywhere in the state to equal enjoyment of the same benefits and procedures under
the juvenile laws .. .should be denied only for the most compelling of reasons." Id.

at 74-75. The juveniles also alleged that the classification in question infringed upon
their fundamental right to vote. Id. at 75. The appellees pointed out that conviction
of the offenses alleged to have been committed by them would result in a deprivation
of their right to vote. "If treated as juveniles, however, disposition of these charges
may not operate to impose any civil disabilities." Id. The appellees also asserted that
the state statutes infringed upon their right to privacy. Criminal trials take place
in public, become a matter of public record, and stigmatize a defendant in a manner
which may follow the convicted person for the remainder of his life. Juvenile proceedings, however, appellees argued, are especially geared to protect a child from "the
taint of criminality ...thereby giving added protection to the child's right to privacy."
Id. at 76. Finally, the appellees advocated the application of the strict scrutiny test
because the alleged discriminations adversely affected a class of individuals, who,
because of their age, had little, if any impact upon or bargaining power within the
political process. Id. at 77-79. See 272 Md. at 392, 325 A.2d at 413.
110. 411 U.S. at 33-34.
111. 394 U.S.618, 655, 661 (1969).
112. 411 U.S. at 31.
113. The Court of Appeals cited Bruce with approval for this proposition. 272
Md. at 399, 325 A.2d at 417.
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Trader, Stokes and Thomas were predictable since none of the appellees
in those cases presented any evidence which would tend to overcome the
presumption of legislative validity of the statutes under which they were
adjudicated. As to Faulkner, the court never reached the issue thus presented, although Faulkner "presented evidence plainly tending to demonstrate that the Legislature had no rational basis for treating" him as it
did.114 The court dismissed the State's appeal on other grounds." 5 Despite
the fact that the decision in the case of Faulkner was reached on narrower
grounds, the court felt it important to caution:
[S]hould the State in future cases, in the face of a record like that
presented in Faulkner, choose not to contradict the plain import of
such evidence as it bears on the Faulkner issue, the juvenile courts
might well conclude 'that no rational basis exists for the different treatment [provided by the statute] .116

The caution provided by the court in its disposition of the case of
Faulkner, especially in view of the fact that it need not have provided such,
is indicative of the continuing willingness of the Court of Appeals to
strengthen its equal protection analysis. That view is buttressed by the
decision in Bruce, a case which might arguably be viewed as one having
involved the application of the strict scrutiny test couched in less than
orthodox language." 7 The validity of that characterization of Bruce, however, is mitigated by the fact that in the course of its discussion of the interplay of legislative and judicial roles, the court relied upon Allied American
114. Id. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418.
115. See discussion in text accompanying notes 20 and 29 supra.

116. 272 Md. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418. In a case decided on March 12, 1975, the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, was confronted with a challenge
by a group of juveniles charged with the commission of certain offenses in Prince
George's County of the identical statute involved in the appeal by Stokes. State v.
Jones, No. 14,178 (Prince George's County Cir. March 12, 1975). After including
in its opinion the summarized testimony of numerous expert witnesses presented by
the juveniles to attack the constitutionality of the statute, the court concluded that
"The requisite basis for the distinction was not shown. The evidence is overwhelming
for testimonies of all the witnesses clearly assert this conclusion." Id., slip opinion
at 12. The State presented no evidence to rebut the contention of the juveniles or to
support the constitutionality of the statute brought into question other than statistics
tending to show "that Prince George's County had a higher rate of reported crimes
than Montgomery County except for the crime of larceny." Id., slip opinion at 11.
The court noted the decision in In re Trader, and held the statute unconstitutional
since no rational basis for the classification had been established. Additionally, the
court found itself "unable to hypothesize further situations tending to show a
'legitimate state objective' in distinguishing between those defendants and their counterparts in age and deed in Montgomery County." Id., slip opinion at 10.
117. See the test accompanying notes 105-06 supra, suggesting that in Bruce, the
court was presented with reasons usually sufficient to sustain the legislative classification challenged therein under the traditional Lindsley test, and the court nevertheless
struck down the challenged statute as violative of the equal protection clause.
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Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,"" and utilized the
rational basis framework in reaching its decision. Hence, if strict scrutiny
was not the measure used by the court in its resolution of Bruce, and since
a rational basis was admittedly found by the court which should have
satisfied the Lindsley test, it can only be concluded that the court in Bruce
mirrored the admonition as to Faulkner, n19 and required a greater showing
of rationality. By indicating in its decision as to Faulkner that the court
would not in future cases look beyond the evidence presented by the State
to mere conjecture 120 to supply a rational basis for the establishment of a
legislative scheme, the court provided additional support to the nascent
invigorated rational basis test recognizable in Bruce. While the resolution
of the issues raised in the consolidated appeals presented in In Re Trader
did not extend the rational basis test, the admonitions presented therein
evidence the potential willingness of the Court of Appeals in a future case
to formulate explicitly a stronger rational basis test.
Rodriguez is a recent decision in a series of cases in which the
Supreme Court has searched for a manner of scrutinizing the means employed to implement an underlying legislative purpose, that is more exacting than that provided by the traditional rational basis test, but less ap21
parently arbitrary than that demonstrated by the strict scrutiny test.1
The potential foreshadowed by In Re Trader exemplifies the same type of
search by the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
There was little doubt that the court would have been presented with
an opportunity to continue that search in later litigation if the statutory
scheme had not been changed by the legislature. 122 If the admonition as to
Faulkner indeed foreshadowed the likely approach of the Court of Appeals
in a later case, then the State's claims in In Re Trader supportive of the
rationality of the questioned statutory scheme may well have been subjected to some greater amount of judicial scrutiny.
The challenged classifications involved in In Re Trader were contained in statutes describing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Maryland
juvenile courts in terms of the site of the commission of the charged delinquent act. 123 Thus, two distinct classes were created by the statutes involved, treating juveniles included within them disparately. One class
consisted ,of all juveniles having committed a delinquent act in Montgomery
County; the other, of all juveniles committing delinquent acts anywhere
118. 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).
119. 272 Md. at 402, 325 A.2d at 418.
120. A discussion of the traditional rational basis test, which would permit conjectural bases, may be found at note 96 and accompanying text supra.
121. See note 77 supra.
122. See note 2 supra.
123. In re Trader, 272 Md. at 368-69, 325 A2d at,401, construing ch. 2, § 1,
[1973] Md. Laws, Sp. Sess. 7, 142, 151, 186-87 (sections 3-804, 3-818, and 4-504 of the
repealed juvenile statutes).
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else in the state. Place of residence in no way affected or determined under
2
which set of procedures an accused juvenile would be governed.' 4
Certainly a delinquent act committed in Montgomery County has
the same impact upon that jurisdiction as the same delinquent act committed in any other county has upon that jurisdiction; furthermore, substantial evidence exists to support the proposition that there are no significant physical or emotional bases for concluding that juveniles committing delinquent acts in Montgomery County are in any way different
than juveniles committing such acts in any other part of the state. 1 25 The
character of juvenile acts committed in Montgomery County and in the
rest of the state are similarly not distinguishable. Hence, it was likely that
the only substantial difference between the juvenile system established in
Montgomery County and that existing in the rest of the state derived
from the differing facilities or benefits available in each to persons subjected
to juvenile treatment. That contention is seemingly buttressed by the fact
that the rational bases advanced by the State in In Re Trader for the
variance in statutory treatment all pertained to the inherent differences in
the juvenile system of Montgomery County. 12
It therefore becomes likely that under the admonition as to Faulkner,
the standard by which the means employed by the legislature to achieve
its purpose in creating the challenged state scheme must be measured are
those legislative purposes advanced by the State during the course of trial
litigation, and particularly those announced by the legislature itself during
its passage of the plan. In light of those expressed legislative purposes it
was most difficult to understand how means which absolutely deny statutory benefits to a set of juveniles in one jurisdiction, while granting those
benefits to another set of identical juveniles in another jurisdiction are a
rational way of achieving that legislative purpose. Such was the case in
Long v. Robinson,127 where the court was confronted with a statutory
provision setting the upper age limit for juvenile jurisdiction in the courts
124. 272 Md. at 368-69, 325 A.2d at 401.
125. See discussion contained in Brief of Appellees at 31-42 and in Long v.

Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 22, 26-28 (D.Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
126. 272 Md. at 378-79, 325 A.2d at 405-06. See Brief of Appellant at 16-18.

The State cited the "separate and unique development of Montgomery County's juvenile laws and procedures," ict. at 16, and the existence in the jurisdiction of "detention
and rehabilitation facilities uniquely available to the Montgomery County juvenile
offender." Id. at 17. Furthermore, appellant contended that it might be speculated

that "the General Assembly believed in trying, on an experimental basis, different
procedures for handling juvenile offenders in Montgomery County that might subsequently be found to be more or less preferable and/or applicable to the remainder of
the State." Id. The court impliedly found the potential rational bases presented by
the State to be insufficient when it observed that a future court might find the statutory
scheme in question to be unconstitutional if confronted with a record similar to that
developed by Faulkner, and if given no rebuttal evidence by the State. 272 Md. at 402,
325 A.2d at 418.
127. 316 F. Supp. 22 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 436 F.2d 1116 (4th Cir. 1971).
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of Baltimore City at sixteen years of age. In all other Maryland subdivisions, persons under the age of eighteen charged with the commission
of delinquent acts were subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts.
The court found the absolute denial of juvenile treatment to sixteen and
seventeen-year-old youths charged with offenses in Baltimore City to be
128
violative of the equal protection clause.
It was less difficult, though problematical, to reconcile a difference in
legislative treatment of similar juveniles in different jurisdictions which
merely results in a variance in the degree of the benefits available in such
jurisdictions. In the case of Trader, orders waiving jurisdiction of the
juvenile court in Montgomery County were immediately appealable, while
interlocutory in the rest of the state. Absolute denial of a benefit conferred
by the juvenile system could probably not have been asserted, since such
an order was appealable at some point in either instance, even if such appeal
might be forced to await final judgment. 129 In the case of Stokes, a sixteenyear-old juvenile who was charged with robbery with a deadly weapon
was exempted from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in all parts of the
state except Montgomery County, subject to a determination by the
criminal court in which he was charged that the case should be waived
to juvenile court. Statutes applicable to Montgomery County included no
such exemption from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts. The reverse
waiver procedures contained in statutory provisions applicable in jurisdictions other than Montgomery County did not preclude, under all circumstances, a sixteen-year-old who had committed armed robbery from being
treated as a juvenile. If treatment as a juvenile offender is indeed a benefit,
as the court seems to indicate in In Re Trader,130 there was no absolute
denial of that benefit to Stokes.' 3 ' In the cases of Faulkner and Thomas,
no juvenile between the ages of fourteen and sixteen could be waived from
juvenile to criminal court under any circumstances in Montgomery County,
while the statutes governing juvenile proceedings in the rest of the state
permitted waiver of such fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds in certain circumstances. Once again the benefits of juvenile treatment were subject to
greater restriction in jurisdictions other than Montgomery County, but
were never absolutely denied in such jurisdictions.
128. 316 F. Supp. at 30.
129. It is worthwhile to note, however, that as a result of the interlocutory nature
of juvenile waiver orders in non-Montgomery County subdivisions, juveniles possibly
faced several months of confinement in post-conviction facilities prior to an opportunity to review the denial of juvenile jurisdiction. Brief of Appellees at 52 n.76.
130. 272 Md. at 399-402, 325 A.2d at 417-18.
131. Appellees discussed the potentially harmful effects of reverse waiver. It was
noted that unlike in initial waiver proceedings (held in juvenile court), reverse waiver
proceedings place the burden of proof upon the offender. It is the juvenile who must
meet the burden of proof required to convince the court that he should be waived to
juvenile court. Furthermore, the juvenile arrested as an adult will be "booked" and
confined with adult offenders. Brief of Appellees at 50-52.
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The court in each of these cases was faced with a situation in which
greater benefits were statutorily conferred upon members of one legislatively prescribed class than upon members of another such class, although
such benefits were not absolutely denied to members of either class. The
same type of situation was faced by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez,
where greater educational benefits accrued to school children residing in
some Texas counties than in others. In that case, the Supreme Court, while
apparently applying an invigorated rational basis test, found that existing
differentials permitted under applicable state law were supported by a
positive relation between the means thus employed and the purpose de18 2
signed to be achieved, on the basis of materials presented to the Court.
The court in the case of Faulkner hints that it might require a similar
showing in the future. Hence, in subsequent litigation involving the same
types of issues presented in In Re Trader, the court might well look to the
State, and not rely on its own conjecture, when faced with a sufficient
quantum of evidence adduced by those challenging a statute to show its
unconstitutionality. 13 Absent the showing of empirical evidence by the
State tending to demonstrate a positive relation between the means employed and the purposes designed to be achieved, challenged classificatory
schemes might be deemed violative of the equal protection clause. The
application of a strengthened rational basis test to the statutory scheme
attacked in In Re Trader was pre-empted by the action of the legislature.
Its utilization by the Court of Appeals must therefore await future instances
wherein state statutory classifications are alleged to deny rights guaranteed
under the equal protection clause of the Constitution of the United States.
132. 411 U.S. at 44-55.
133. "[S]hould the State in future cases, in the face of a record like that presented
in Faulkner, choose not to contradict the plain import of such evidence as it bears
on the Faulkner issue, the juvenile courts might well conclude that no rational basis
exists . . .". 272 Md at 402, 325 A.2d at 418. Note that the Supreme Court in
Rodriguez stated that "the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether
it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not
constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." 411 U.S. at 17 (emphasis supplied). In this manner, the
Court seemed to rule out a court-conceived basis.

